Abstract. In this paper, we investigate the problem of how to prove the authorship of textual documents. First we define the basic functionalities of an authorship proof scheme (APS) based on natural language watermarking, and identify two essential security requirements for an APS to be secure against various attacks. We review existing natural language watermarking schemes, and we propose two new schemes with improved security.
Introduction
The Internet has provided a new publishing channel for writers. Now many writers put their work online before officially publishing them in traditional media. Such practice benefits the writers by allowing feedback from readers and by promoting their works to publishers. This creates a new problem about protecting authors' rights, specifically, their authorship. Usually authors do not care if their work is reprinted online elsewhere, as long as the correct authorship is stated. However, someone may copy a text and reprint it online, or publish it in official channels, in his or her own name. Such cases have been observed. When this happens, it is difficult for the true authors to dispute their authorship.
The same problem for digital multimedia such as image, audio, and video can be solved by using digital watermarking techniques. Some researchers have tried to solve the problem for textual documents with similar approaches. One approach is to transform a textual document to an image, and then apply image watermarks [5] , [4] , [9] . Another approach embeds information in a text by modifying the appearance of its elements such as the fonts, space between lines and words, etc. (see [7] , [6] , [11] , [13] ). A common problem of the above two approaches is that the watermark can be erased by reformatting or re-typing the text document.
In this paper we use natural language watermarks (see [18] , [17] , [2] , [19] , [1] , [8] , [10] ) to solve the problem. Our contributions in this paper are as follows:
-Identify and define the properties of an authorship proof scheme (APS) (section 2).
-Investigate existing natural language watermark schemes that are possible candidates for APS (section 3). -Propose two schemes that are robust against watermark erasure attacks (section 4).
In addition, we discuss remaining problems and further improvements for APS in section 5.
Authorship Proof Scheme

Functionalities and Security
First we identify the basic functionalities of an APS, the components it must have, the attacks it may be confronted with, and the security properties it has to provide. We assume that an author has several texts updated on April 24, 2007 research supported by an NSERC post-graduate scholarship research supported by NSERC discovery grant 203114-06
1. The adversary may try to find out the author's master key, K. 2. The adversary may try to extract a specific secret key, K T . 3. The adversary may try to declare authorship on a T w by computing a K such that V (K , T w ) = true while K = K T (we call this an impersonation attack). 4. The adversary may try to erase the watermark in T w by making some changes on T w to produce T w which has essentially the same content as T w , but where V (K T , T w ) = f alse (we call this an erasure attack). 5. The adversary may watermark a text T w with his or her own key to produce a T w and declare authorship on T w (we call this a double watermark attack).
For the above APS, K is secure since it is only used as a seed to compute some hash values K T using a cryptographic hash function. Since each text T will be different, the keys K T = h(K||T ) can be regarded random and independent of each other. It is not difficult to show that knowing some other watermarked texts does not help to attack a certain T w or its K T . Therefore we only need to analyze, when an adversary is given one T w , if he or she is able to find out the corresponding K T , or succeed in an impersonation attack, erasure attack, or double watermark attack on the given T w .
Next we show that if an APS satisfies the following two basic security requirements, then it is secure against all the attacks described above:
1. Low false negative probability A false negative occurs if an adversary can edit T w by inserting/deleting/modifying some sentences to produce T w such that V (K T , T w ) = f alse. False negative probability indicates robustness of the embedded watermark. 2. Low false positive probability A false positive is the event that
False positive probability must be very small to prevent impersonation attacks. In this paper, we stipulate that false positive probability is less than = 1/2 56 , which is the security level of a well-chosen password consisting of eight ASCII characters.
Low false negative probability implies the embedded watermark is secure (otherwise the adversary can easily erase the watermark with certainty), which in turn implies K T is secure (otherwise the adversary can find out the watermark using K T ). In the case of a double watermark attack, the adversary produces T w = E(K , T w ) using his or her own K . The adversary can prove authorship on T w but not on T w (because of the low false positive probability), while the true author can prove authorship on both T w and T w (because of the low false negative probability). This indicates that T w is produced by modifying T w , which resolves the dispute.
Since low false negative probability and low false positive probability indicate the security of an APS against all the attacks we have identified, in the following parts, we only need to analyze these two properties of an APS.
APS Evaluation
For an APS, its false positive probability must be lower than the pre-defined security level , but we do not mind if the false positive probability of one scheme is lower than that of another, as long as they are both lower than . That is, as long as the schemes are secure, it does not matter so much if one is more secure. For false negative probability, we hope that it is as low as possible. Therefore, to compare two schemes, first we tune their settings so that their false positive probabilities are all close to and lower than , then we compare their false negative probabilities to see which one is more robust.
Related Works
Natural Language Watermarking
Natural language watermarking embeds information using linguistic transformations such as synonym substitution, syntactic transformations and semantic transformations (see [18] , [17] , [2] , [19] , [1] , [8] , [10] ). It embeds a bitstream as a watermark in a text document, while preserving the meaning, context, and flow of the document. The modifications to the text are imperceptible. A natural language watermark scheme consists of two processes, a watermark embedding process and a watermark extraction process. The rightful owner has the original text and a secret key. The embedding process takes the text, the key, and some watermark information as inputs and produces a watermarked text, which is published. The watermark can be extracted from the watermarked text only with the knowledge of the key. The basic requirement of these schemes is that the watermark should not be perceivable, otherwise an adversary can easily erase the the watermark. As general-purpose watermark schemes, some other requirements, e.g., resistance to collusion attacks, are also considered in such schemes.
Previous Schemes
We briefly analyze the robustness of existing natural language watermarking schemes that can be used for authorship proof. There have only been a few such schemes, e.g., [2] , [1] and [8] , that are suitable for this purpose. In [2] Atallah et al. treat a text as a collection of sentences. The syntactic structure of a sentence is used to embed the watermark. Suppose a text T consists of m sentences, and an n-bit watermark is to be embedded in n sentences (i.e., we have one watermark bit for each of the watermarked sentences). A secret rank is computed for each sentence in T . The n sentences with least ranks are chosen as markers. Each sentence following a marker is transformed to carry one bit of the watermark. Both rank computing and watermark insertion are based on a secret key. Without the key, the probability that an adversary can forge a text with a valid n-bit watermark is 2 −n , i.e., the false positive probability of this scheme is 2 −n . When the adversary tries to erase the watermark, he or she cannot locate the markers or the watermarked sentences without the key. So the adversary can only randomly insert/delete/modify some sentences. When an inserted sentence happens to have a small rank, or it happens to be inserted right after a marker, the watermark will be damaged. When a deleted sentence happens to be a marker or a watermarked sentence, the watermark will also be damaged. When a modified sentence is a marker or a watermarked sentence, or the rank of the modified sentence becomes one of the n least ranks, the watermark will be damaged too. The probability that one random sentence insert/delete/modify operation can destroy the watermark is no more than 3n/m. Therefore, when c sentences are inserted/deleted/modified, the false negative probability is 1
c . For example for n = 56, m = 2000, when the adversary randomly edits eight sentences, the false negative probability is 0.5, i.e., there is a 50% chance the watermark will be erased.
A follow-up paper [1] improves upon [2] in terms of the number of watermark bits embedded in one sentence. The algorithms used in [1] are the same as in [2] , but the algorithms are applied to the sematic structure of a sentence, instead of the syntactic structure, to embed the watermark bits. Since the semantic structure is much larger and richer than the syntactic structure, this allows transformations of a large number of elements they contain, and therefore it achieves more watermark bits in one sentence. In view of robustness, the probability that one sentence insert/delete/modify can destroy the watermark in [1] is the same as [2] , therefore its false negative probability is also the same as [2] .
In [8] Gupta et al. proposed a scheme to improve the robustness. The scheme treats the text as a collection of paragraphs, each of which consists of number of sentences. In the scheme, the paragraphs are ordered according to the number of the sentences in it. Although the scheme is robust against various possible attacks, these attacks do not cover all possible attacks (from a cryptanalyst's point of view) which can effectively erase the watermark, e.g., insert/delete a paragraph, or insert/delete sentences in a paragraph such that its order is changed. In such cases, the false negative probability is rather high.
To the best of our knowledge, the most robust APS we can find in previous works are the ones from [2] or [1] . We use the scheme in [2] as an example and refer to it as APS1 hereafter.
Proposed Schemes
In this section we propose two new robust authorship proof schemes, APS2 and APS3. The building blocks of our schemes include:
A cryptographic hash function takes a variable length input and produces a fixed length output which can be considered to be randomly uniformly distributed on the function domain.
A text meaning representation (TMR) is a language-independent description of the information conveyed in natural language text. The theory and methodology of TMR have been studied and applied in machine translation systems. For more about TMR, we refer to [15] , [14] , [3] , [16] . In this paper, we do not go into the details of TMR. We simply assume the existence of a TMR system M () which takes as input a sentence s and outputs its meaning representation M (s). For literally different sentences which have the same meaning, their meaning representations are the same, so when s is rewritten to s , which is literally different but has the same meaning, its meaning representation does not change, i.e., we have
The edit distance, also named Levenshtein Distance, between two strings is the minimum number of character insert/delete/modify operations on one string to produce the other string. We use D Lev (S 1 , S 2 ) to denote the edit distance between the strings S 1 and S 2 . Given two strings, their edit distance can be computed using dynamic programming algorithms [12] .
APS2
Following are the parameters and functions defined in APS2:
* → K, a hash function to generate a key.
n , a hash function with n-bit output.
160 , a keyed hash function with 160-bit output.
* → {0, 1}, a hash function with 1-bit output. d max : a pre-defined threshold. If the edit distance between a damaged watermark and the original watermark is no greater than d max , then the damaged one is considered valid.
We note that h 0 , h 1 , h 2 and h 3 can be easily constructed from standard cryptographic hash functions such as SHA-1.
APS2 Watermark Embedding. Given an original text document T , the author computes K
where K is the master key, then performs the following embedding process: 
The produced textual document T w is then made public. After s ji is rewritten to s ji , its literal expression is changed such that the watermark bit w ji is "embedded", meanwhile, its meaning does not change, and hence ranks of the rewritten sentences do not change, either.
APS2 Authorship Verification.
To prove the authorship of T w , the author presents K T and runs the verification process V (K T , T w ) as follows: Each row of the table contains a set of two synonyms and a number as their meaning representation. The TMR of a sentence is defined as a string in which a word is replaced by its meaning representation. For example, the TMR of the sentence, "The Internet has provided a new publishing channel for writers", is "The Internet has 1 a 2 publishing 3 for writers".
Suppose K T computed for this text is 123. Then the watermark is W = 1111. Next the author computes the ranks of the sentences using h 2 and the TMR defined above. Suppose the results are (in hex format) dd21, dab6, 298c, 1b27, 3064, 2539, 04f0, and 6bc9 respectively. The seventh, fourth, sixth and third sentences are selected to embed the four watermark bits since they have the least ranks.
The author then rewrites the four sentences (if necessary) to embed the watermark. For example, the author checks h 3 (K T , s 3 ). Since the result is 0, the author replaces feedback with response. Now the result is 1, which means the watermark bit is embedded. The outputted T w is as follows:
( We include the numbers of the sentences in the above paragraph for easy reading. In the third sentence, feedback is replaced with response. In the seventh sentence, cases is replaced with situations. The resulting T w is published.
1) The Internet has provided a new publishing channel for writers. (2) Nowadays many writers put their works online before officially publishing them in traditional media. (3) Such practice benefits the writers by allowing response from readers and by promoting their works to publishers. (4) Meanwhile it incurs a new
Suppose the adversary rewrites the first sentence as The Internet has offered a novel publishing channel for writers, and deletes the seventh sentence.
In the verification process, the author supplies the key K T = 123 to the versification process. Since n + d max = 5, the five sentences in T w with least ranks, i.e., sentences 4, 6, 3, 5 and 8, are selected. A five-bit string 111xx (x could be either 0 or 1) is extracted using h 3 . A prefix, 111, and the watermark 1111 have an edit distance at most 1, so the verification process will output true.
Remark on the example. Note we provide a very simple TMR to make a concrete example of our scheme. TMR is a research topic in natural language processing and is not the focus of this paper. In practice, we may need TMR more sophisticated than that in the example in order to support desired transformations.
APS2 Watermark and Key Secrecy. Given T w , the adversary can compute h 3 (s i ) for each sentence. The string {h 3 (s i )} includes the watermark which is a pseudo-random string generated by h 1 (K T ). For the sentences not rewritten in the watermark embedding process, their h 3 values can be regarded as random bits. It is not difficult to show that, given T w , it is infeasible for the adversary to tell what is the watermark, which sentences carry the watermark, nor can the adversary infer any information about the key K T .
APS2 False Positive Probability. Since the adversary cannot infer any information about K T , when trying to impersonate the true author, he or she cannot do better than present a randomly chosen K . The adversary wins if V (K , T w ) = true. Now we consider if the adversary presents a random K , when K = K T , what the probability is that
the set of strings whose lengths is l, and whose edit distances from W = h 1 (K ) are at most d max . Any string in A l can be produced by applying d ≤ d max insertion/deletion/modifcation operations on W . We can assume these operations affect disjoint bits. Also it is easy to check that the order of the operations does not affect the result. Given n, l, and d max , we have
In the above inequality, in an n-bit string.
If T w is not produced by using K , then we can assume that W = h 1 (K ) and the n + d max bits W generated from T w and K are independent random strings. In the verification process, if any prefix of W is in A, the verification process will output true, and a false positive event happens. There are 2d max + 1 different prefixes of W whose edit distances from W are possibly no more than d max . The lengths of these prefixes range from n − d max to n + d max . Therefore, the false positive probability is
APS2 False Negative Probability. Since given T w , the adversary does not know which sentences carry the watermark nor what is the watermark, when the adversary changes T w in order to erase the watermark, he or she can do it only in a random way . When the adversary inserts a new sentence, the probability that one bit is inserted into the watermark, which is the same as the probability that the rank of the new sentence is among the n least ranks of all the m ranks, is n/m. When the adversary modifies (without change the meaning 1 ) or delete a sentence, the probability that one bit in the watermark is changed or deleted is n/m. So when c sentences are inserted/deleted/modified in T w , the false negative probability of APS2 is
Other edit operations, such as moving/switching sentences, do not damage the watermark.
APS2
Parameters. In this part we use some concrete parameters to check the performance of APS2. Suppose k = 100 is fixed first. The false positive probability of APS2 is determined by n and d max . Given m and c, the false negative probability of APS2 is determined by n and d max too. Different pairs (n, d max ) may result in the same false positive probability and different false negative probability. So we hope to find the (n, d max ) such that false positive probability ≤ , while the false negative probability is the least. We set m = 2000, c = 200, and compute the minimum n such that the false positive probability ≤ = 2 −56 , and the corresponding false negative probability. The results are shown in Figures 1 and 2 respectively. The results suggest that a large value of d max is beneficial. In the above example, such an (n, d max ) pair, say (321, 40), results in both small false negative probability (0.06) and false positive probability (< ). We can use bigger d max to achieve smaller false negative probability. The cost is a longer watermark, which means more effort is required to embed the watermark. Now we set n = 321, d max = 40 for APS2, and n = 56 for APS1. In such a setting, the false positive probabilities of both APS1 and APS2 are close and no more than . We compare their false negative probabilities as a function of c in Figure 3 , which shows a significant improvement of APS2, as compared to APS1, in robustness. Remarks on Design of APS2. The design of APS2 uses two approaches to improve the work in [2] and [1] . First, in the previous schemes, two sentences, a marker and a carrier, are necessary to carry one watermark bit. The reason that a marker itself cannot carry a watermark bit is that if it is changed to carry the watermark, its rank will be changed and is no longer a valid marker. We solve this dilemma by using TMR to compute the rank, and inserting the watermark bits in the marker sentences by changing their literal expression without changing their TMR. Thus, we not only lower the probability that the watermark is damaged when one sentence is inserted/deleted/modified (from 3n m to n m ), but we also get rid of the watermark damage caused by moving/switching the sentences.
Another approach used in APS2 to improve the robustness is based on the simple idea of error-tolerance: when a small number of bits are damaged in a long watermark, the damaged watermark should still be regarded as valid. We use edit distance to quantify the extent to which a watermark is damaged. It turns out that this measure significantly improves the robustness of the scheme.
APS3
APS2 relies on TMR systems. In this section, we design a lightweight scheme, denoted APS3, without using TMR systems. APS3 uses the same building blocks as APS2, except that it does not use the functions M () or h 2 (). Note that the value of p is not used in the verification process.
APS3 Watermark and Key Secrecy. When an adversary applies h 3 to each sentence in T w , he or she gets an m-bit string S which contains the watermark W starting from the p th bit in S. S consists of three parts: a p-bit random string (from bit 0 to bit p − 1), followed by an n-bit pseudo-random string W , followed by an m − p − n bit random string (from bit p + n to bit m − 1). Given such a string, assume h 1 is a secure pseudo-random bit generator, then it is infeasible for the adversary to determine which part is W , i.e., the watermark is imperceptible to the adversary.
In APS3, the watermark will be damaged only when the adversary deletes/modifies sentences in the n-sentence block that carries the watermark, or inserts sentences in that block. Since the adversary does not know where in T w the block is, when the adversary tries to erase the watermark by editing T w , he or she cannot do better than rewrite/delete randomly chosen sentences in T w , or insert new sentences at random locations in T w .
Note that unlike APS2, APS3 is not immune to sentence move/switch. Such attacks can be regarded as combination of multiple sentence insert/delete.
Since the adversary cannot find the watermark in T w , he or she can compute nothing about the secret key K T which is used to generate T w (in fact, since h 1 is a secure hash function, even given the watermark W = h 1 (K T ), the adversary cannot find K T ).
APS3 False Positive Probability. Since the adversary knows nothing about K T , to prove he or she is the true author of T w , the adversary cannot do better than choosing a random K . If V (K , T w ) happens to output true, a false positive event happens and the adversary wins. Next we analyze the false positive probability of APS3.
In (1) we have computed |A l |, the number of strings whose lengths are l, and whose edit distances from W are at most d max where W = h 1 (K ). If any of the contiguous substrings of the m-bit string S is in any A l , a false positive event happens. Since there are at most m different contiguous substrings of any given length l in S, and only the substrings of length n − d max ≤ l ≤ n + d max can possibly be in an A l , the false positive probability is
APS3 False Negative Probability. As we have analyzed, the best way an adversary can damage the watermark is to delete/modify sentences randomly chosen from T w , or insert new sentences at randomly chosen locations in T w . Given m, n, d max , and c, the false negative probability of APS3 is the same as that of APS2, i.e.,
APS2 and APS3 Comparison. We compare the minimum n to achieve false positive probabilities ≤ , and corresponding false negative probabilities of APS2 and APS3 in Figure 4 and 5 respectively. It shows with the same d max , APS3 needs a larger value of n to achieve the same false positive probability, and the corresponding false negative probability is higher. It is consistent with the intuition that, since APS3 searches the watermark in a wider range, it needs a smaller d max or a larger n to keep the same false positive probability. Then the smaller d max or larger n results in a higher false negative probability. Although APS3 is not as robust as APS2, it does not rely on TMR and is much simpler. It may be an alternative to APS2 in occasions where simplicity is more important.
Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the problem of how to prove the authorship of a textual document. We identified and defined the general requirements for authorship proof schemes (APS). We studied existing natural language watermark techniques to solve the problem, and we proposed two new schemes which are more robust than the previous ones.
There are two techniques in our schemes which improved the robustness:
